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Off-Label or Out of Bounds?
Prescriber and Marketer Liability for
Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs
James O'Reilly' and Amy Dalal2

I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2003 marks four decades since Congress first required drug
makers to prove the effectiveness of their pharmaceutical drugs prior to the
marketing of those drugs. Over the forty years since its adoption, this
statutory command has given Americans the world's most protective
regulatory system for drug consumers.3 This article discusses how, in the
last five years, Congress and the Food and Drug Association have made
changes to that protection, by lowering the regulatory barriers to "offlabel" promotion of pharmaceuticals for unapproved uses.
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has comprehensively
examined the proof underlying drug effectiveness claims for four decades.
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 19974
("FDAMA") has been recognized by the FDA as "one of the most
demanding challenges faced by the agency in its 92-year history." ' The
FDAMA has reaffirmed the FDA's role as protector of the public health,
but has also imposed significant new obligations on the agency; thereby
limiting its control on governing pharmaceutical marketing practices.
One major aspect of FDAMA is section 401,6 which imposes a limitation

1. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; B.A., Boston College; J.D.,
University of Virginia.
2. J.D. expected 2004, University of Cincinnati.
3. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 784 (1962).
4. Food & Drug Admin. Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & West. Supp.
2000) (codified as amended at Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2356 (1997)) [hereinafter
FDAMA].
5. A Message to FDA Stakeholders (July 22, 1998), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/fdamal
comm/message.htm.
6. 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (codified as amended at Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2356
(1997)).
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of the FDA's previously absolute authority 7 to prohibit the dissemination of
off-label information by drug manufacturers.! The FDA reviews and
approves the marketer's claims of drug benefit when it approves the new
drug's label. 9 The advertising and promotion of the claims can begin once
the FDA approval of the product label containing that specific use claim is
received.' By contrast, an "off-label" claim is one that has not undergone
the FDA scrutiny and approval." To say that a claim is off-label signifies
that government scientists have not yet approved that claim based on
scientific studies; it does not necessarily mean that the drug does not have
the effect that it is claimed to have.
Traditionally, the FDA has generally recognized a physician's right to
prescribe the best medicine for treatment.' 2 This tolerance, however, has
had an uneasy linkage to the FDA obligation to assure that manufacturers
comply with the law's requirement for pre-marketing approval of claims for
all new drugs.' 3 This led to pressure from various interest groups to enforce
some amount of regulation on the off-label use of drugs, while drug
marketers pressed to be freed from FDA control of all claims of product
effectiveness. The result has been a congressional grant of authority,
codified in section 401 of FDAMA, ' to the FDA to regulate the distribution
of information by drug manufacturers. Section 401 is aimed at ensuring
that only truthful, non-misleading information concerning prescription
drugs and devices is distributed to the medical community, including, but
not limited, to physicians.
Off-label promotion of prescription drugs has always been a troublesome
area for the FDA enforcement staff.'5 This article describes and critiques
the various approaches in dealing with off-label use, assesses the passage of
FDAMA, highlights the litigation under FDAMA relating to promotion of
off-label use information, and analyzes the present FDA policies and
initiatives. This article will then examine the litigation issues and the
7. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d) (2000), 355(a) (2000 & West. Supp. 2000), 360(a)
(2000).
8. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(z) (2000), 360(b) (2000).
9. Food & Drug Admin., 21 C.F.R. § 314.105 (2000).
10. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.105(c) (2000), 314.550 (2000).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-5(4)(A) (2000).
12. See Karen Bradshaw, The Food and Drug Administration Modernization and
Accountability Act of 1997: Is it the Answer to the Off-Label Advertising Debate?, Spring
1998, at http://leda.law.harvard.eduIleda/data/226/kbradshaw.pdf.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000 & West. Supp. 2000).
14. See FDAMA, supra note 4; 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2000).
15. See, e.g., I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA's Final Guidance on
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 193 (1998).
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pressures of new communication methods, such as Internet websites, upon
the FDA's ability to control the flow of promotional information about
prescription drugs. Lastly, this article will evaluate the long-term effects of
FDAMA's section 401 and offer predictions and recommendations for the
future of off-label use.
II. SECTION 401 AND ITS ROOTS
The Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, prior to its 1997 amendments, expressly
forbade the sale of a drug whose labeling or advertising claims of
effectiveness had not yet received approval from the FDA. 6 FDA policy
held that "pharmaceutical manufacturers cannot proactively discuss offlabel uses, nor may they distribute written materials (promotional pieces,
reprints of articles, etc.) that mention off-label uses."' 7

The

1997

Amendments resulted from a major effort of lobbyists for the
pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, section 401 of FDAMA enables drug
manufacturers to distribute information regarding the off-label use,
provided that the manufacturer complies with the following requirements:
(1) submission of a supplemental new drug application ("NDA") for the
new use;
(2) dissemination of information that is not abridged, false, misleading,
or posing a significant health risk to the public;
(3) all clinical research found in the disseminated materials is the work
of the manufacturer;
(4) submit a copy of the materials to the FDA at least sixty days prior to
dissemination; and
(5) include in all disseminated materials prominent disclaimers
clarifying that the information disclosed concerns a drug that has
not been approved by the FDA for that particular use. 8
Manufacturers have a continuing obligation to provide the FDA with any
new information that arises concerning their product. As section 401 was
written, prior to its FDA reinterpretation, if a manufacturer failed to comply
with the requirements, the FDA could order the termination of the
distribution of information until corrective action was taken by the
manufacturer.' 9

16. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a) (2000 & West. Supp. 2000), 33 1(d) (2000), 321(p) (2000).
17. Janet Woodcock, M.D., Lecture to Drug Information Association, A Shift in the
Regulatory Approach (June 23, 1997), at http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/diamontreal/
regappr/sIdOO1 .htm.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2000).
19. HHS News, FDA Proposes Rules for DisseminationInformation of Off-Label Uses
(June 1998), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00643.html.
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III. OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTION OF DRUGS
Off-label prescribing is common in almost every field of medicine. In
1995, the American Medical Association estimated that in the United States
40-60% of prescriptions were written for off-label uses.2 ° Currently, offlabel use is especially common in the areas of oncology, rare diseases,
AIDS treatment, and pediatrics. For example, it is approximated that 50%
of cancer treatment drugs, 80-90% of drugs used to treat rare diseases, and2
80% of drugs used in the pediatric field are prescribed off-label to patients. '
The situation has existed for many years, especially in the treatment of
cancer." Though a product's label may list one or two diseases for which
the approved drug is indicated, physicians often opt to prescribe that drug
for an "off-label" use of the approved drug. The use is characterized as a
new use, because it has not yet been accepted by the FDA, and accordingly,
the manufacturer is required to demonstrate full clinical research results
23
showing its effectiveness for that specific medical problem or disease.
One of the most prominent examples of off-label use is the celebrated
drug Viagra, for erectile dysfunction. Viagra was originally approved by
the FDA to treat chest pain caused by heart disease. Now, Viagra is hailed
as one of the most successful impotency drugs for adult males.24 Similarly,
aspirin was prescribed by physicians off-label for many years to reduce the
risk of heart attacks. It was not until 1998 that the FDA finally approved
such use.25 Off-label activities are defined as "use for indication, dosage
form, dose regimen, population or other use parameter not mentioned in the
approved labeling., 26 These activities can take three basic forms: off-label
use, off-label prescription, and off-label marketing and promotion. All of
these activities deal with the use of drugs in ways not included in the
labeling of the drugs, and thus, in ways not approved by the FDA.
The FDA has historically sought to avoid conflict with any individual
physician's decision to prescribe a drug to an individual patient for an offlabel purpose, stating that "once a [drug] product has been approved for

20. Veronica Henry, Off-Label Prescribing:Legal Implications, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 365,
365 (1999).
21. Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 7.
22. U.S. GENERAL ACCTG. OFFICE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES
CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES, GAO/PEMD-91-14, at 11
(1991).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-5(4)(A) (2000).
24. Louise Schiavone, Consumer group objects to 'off-label' drug promotion, June 25,
1998, at http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9806/25/drug.altematives/.
25.
Peter J. Gross & Linda S. Svitak, Drug and Device Litigation in the 21st Century, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 271, 286 (2000).

26.

Woodcock, supra note 17.
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marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens of
patient populations that are not included in approved labeling., 27 This
official agency policy, known as the "practice of medicine exemption,"
reflects the history of the 1938 Act, which was sponsored by physicianSenator Royal Copeland.
Copeland wanted to assure his medical
constituents that the new requirement for government approval of new
drugs would not adversely impact their ability to prescribe drugs for their
patients. 29 Accordingly, the 1938 Act is silent about the prescriber's
responsibility, and the matter is left to state licensing agencies and the tort
system by default. Additionally, a specific protection for prescriber choice
was built into the medical device statutes, using the same "practice of
medicine" approach.30
Congress has chosen to remain silent regarding the constraints upon the
FDA's powers to protect this potent constituency."
This instance of
statutory inaction permits a medical practitioner to lawfully prescribe an
FDA approved drug for an unapproved use, provided that there is a benefit
to the patient, the patient is completely aware of the nature of his treatment,
and the patient has consented to the use of such treatment. 32 Although
physicians are not required to disclose to their patients that a drug is being
used off-label, it is generally considered good practice to do so.
The long life of the practice of medicine exemption stems from the
FDA's recognition of limits on its ability to oversee the actual use of drugs,
and the recognition that physicians should be given a great deal of
autonomy in their prescribing practices. In 1997, the FDA's chief drug
official stated, "the FDA recognizes that off-label use by prescribers is
often appropriate and may represent the standard of practice." 33 However,
this freedom accorded to physicians does not go unsupervised, because the
fear of tort liability and medical malpractice claims serves as a check on the
prescribing practices of physicians. 34
This off-label use is a critical economic issue for drug manufacturers'
profitability. When a drug is prescribed for an unapproved use, for which
the marketer believes the drug to be effective, its sales may increase
27. 59 Fed. Reg. 59820, 59821 (1994).
28. "(T)his bill makes certain that the medical practitioner shall not be interfered with in
his practice" 78 CONG. Rac. 3, 2728-9 (1934) (statement of Sen. Copeland).

29.

Id. at 2728.

30.
31.
32.

21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 155 (2000).
David B. Rheingold & Paul D. Rheingold, Offense or Defense? Managing the Off-

Label Use Claim, 37 TRIAL 52, 53-54 (Mar. 2001).
33. Woodcock, supra note 17.
34.

David J. Goldberg, Off-Label Prescribingis Common and Accepted in Mainstream,
(Oct. 2000).

DERMATOLOGY TIMEs

Published by LAW eCommons, 2003

5

Annals of Health
Law,of
Vol.Health
12 [2003],
Iss. 2, Art. 8
Annals
Law

[Vol. 12

dramatically, causing the company's profit potential to skyrocket. A fairly
recent example of this potential is the diet drugs debacle. Sales of two
individual drugs, Fenfluramine and Phentermine, in their FDA-approved
form, were modestly successful. However when combined together as a
diet drug, Fen-Phen, sales skyrocketed as physicians began prescribing the
combination for weight loss purposes.35

Unlike the majority of drugs

prescribed for unapproved uses, or in unapproved forms, Fen-Phen caused a
number of serious problems in its users, including valvular heart disease,
and even death.3 6 The Fen-Phen controversy demonstrated that greater
control of promotional communication about unapproved uses is needed to
assure the safety and efficacy of new drugs.37
IV. FDA ENFORCEMENT AND THE PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES
An important distinction must be drawn whenever off-label uses are
discussed. The prescribing physician is given freedom to prescribe for offlabel uses because the incentives to aid individual patients are socially
desired. Conversely, the pharmaceutical company's incentives are purely
financial and more likely to consider the corporate profitability potential
over the risks or benefits for individual patients. The FDA rarely
challenges individual physicians, but continually challenges the
promotional claims of major pharmaceutical marketers. In the FDA's view,
permitting drug companies to promote off-label use would "diminish or
eliminate" incentives to obtain definitive clinical study data. The end result
would erode the statutory standard of proof of drug efficacy, diminish the
use of evidence-based medicine, and "could result in harm to patients from
unstudied uses that actually lead to bad results, or that are merely
ineffective." 38
The FDA made extensive efforts from 1962 to 1997 to force all claims of
new drug effectiveness to undergo rigorous evaluation of clinical data prior
to the advertisement or oral claim being made to prescribing physicians.
Through warning letters and other punitive and precautionary statements,
the FDA sought to aggressively control the issuance of pharmaceutical
product benefit claims that had not yet been reviewed, accepted, and
incorporated into the FDA-approved labels for a drug. Even when the
warning letters did not lead to litigation, the negative publicity about
regulatory displeasure sometimes harmed the targeted companies' stock
35.
36.

Rheingold, supra note 32, at 53.
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2002).

37.

Jaime A. Wilsker, One-Half Phen in the Morning/ One Fen Before Dinner: A

Proposalfor FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L & POL'Y 795, 839 (1998).
38.

Woodcock, supra note 17.
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market perception. Any new drug sponsor who needs additional regulatory
approvals in the future would have a strong incentive to stop making a
claim for an existing drug once the FDA questioned its claim. The FDA
had the statutory authority, the judicial encouragement,39 and the practical
power to resist excessive claims.
Lacking any express authority to regulate physicians' prescription of
drugs for off-label indications, the FDA focused its resources on curtailing
drug manufacturers' promotional and marketing activities. 4 In the era
before Internet search engines and mass media coverage of new
pharmaceutical developments, physicians learned of new uses primarily
from manufacturer sales representatives.
Thus, the FDA became
accustomed to the use of its controls against drug manufacturers, as the
optimal means to restrain claims of a drug's effectiveness that had not yet
received the FDA's approval.
Prior to the 1997 FDAMA, drug manufacturers were explicitly
prohibited from promoting their drugs for any unapproved use.
Unapproved use would render the drug "misbranded" in violation of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.41 The FDA imposed such strict rules on
drug manufacturers for two reasons. First, allowing the free dissemination
of information regarding off-label use would act as a disincentive for drug
companies to perform the requisite clinical studies, to prove that the drug is
safe and effective for the unapproved use.42 Bypassing these studies
enabled the drug companies to save an enormous amount of time and
money. Second, because drug manufacturers have a direct financial stake
in the success of their products, information being disseminated by such
manufacturers have a greater chance of being biased, and thus a greater
chance of misleading the health care professional.4 ' These two reasons
supported the FDA's policy towards off-label use and drug manufacturers
39. Weinberger v. Hynson Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 622 (1973) (noting how
the Supreme Court granted the extraordinary authority for an administrative body, the FDA,
to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction, through a conscious deference to the FDA on
definitions of new drug status. For a further discussion on this topic, see James O'Reilly, 1
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. § 13.04 (1993)).
40. FDA Proposed Rule, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972). "[T]he physician may, as a part of
the practice of medicine, lawfully prescribe a different dosage for his patient, or may
otherwise vary the conditions of use from those approved in the package insert, without
informing or obtaining the approval of the Food and Drug Administration." Id.; see also
David Kessler, Regulating the Prescribingof Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 693, 698 (1978).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2000).
42. For a discussion on the incentives, see Sidney A. Shapiro, Limiting Physician
Freedom to Prescribea Drugfor Any Purpose: The Need for FDA Regulation, 73 Nw. U. L.
REv. 801, 863 (1978).
43. Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 2.
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until November 1997, when FDAMA was adopted.
V. POLICIES UNDERLYING ADOPTION OF FDAMA SECTION

401

Under FDAMA's section 401, for the first time in FDA history, drug
manufacturers were given the right to advertise off-label uses of their
products, provided that they complied with a set of requirements prior to
using the marketing claim. This was a historic retreat from the 1962
statutory policy," which required specific proof and approval of each
claim. 45 The retreat widened later, as a result of the litigation discussed later
in this article.46

Section 401 is construed by the FDA as a "safe harbor" for drug
manufacturers. 7 Under this "safe harbor," if a manufacturer complied with
the statutory requirements, the FDA could not prosecute a company for the
off-label promotion of its product. If the safe harbor is not satisfied, and a
claim is made that was not approved on the FDA-approved product label,
then a violation has occurred, 48 and the FDA may still resort to traditional
misbranding or unapproved new drug charges against a drug marketer. 9
Congress wanted to strike a sound balance between protecting the
public's safety from unscrupulous drug manufacturers, and patients' access
to the best treatment possible. Section 401 was crafted by Republican
Senators William Frist and Connie Mack, and endorsed by several key
Democrats.50 The compromise language allowed a balance to be struck
between these two interests.
VI. ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE OFF-LABEL PROMOTION

The passage of FDAMA and especially section 401 was the culmination
of a long-standing debate between two divergent views of the role of drug
44. 76 Stat. 784 § 104 (1962).
45. The "most notable" aspect of the 1962 legislation was its requirement "that before a
drug could enter the market it must be shown to be 'effective' for its intended use - the use
recommended in its FDA-authorized labeling." Alan Kaplan, Fifty Years of Drug
Amendments Revisited: In Easy-to-Swallow Capsule Form, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 179, 182
(1995).
46. The FDA conceded in a later appellate argument that section 401 would be a safe
harbor, not an affirmative imposition by FDA upon each claim. See Washington Legal
Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This reflects a substantial retreat from the
1960's command that every new drug claim be specifically approved or be deemed in
violation of the statute. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & West. Supp. 2000).
47. Richard Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not with a Bang, But a Whimper, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 477 (2000).

48.
49.
50.

21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2000).
Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2000).
143 Cong. Rec. S 9848-9 (Sept. 24, 1997) (statements of Sen. Mack).
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approval: those who believed that promotion of drugs for off-label use
would allow the public access to potentially life-saving treatments versus
those who believed that off-label use of drugs posed a real threat to the
health and well-being of the American public. It is important to understand
the arguments asserted by each of these camps and to evaluate how their
views have played a role in the passage of FDAMA.
Proponents argue that the key benefit to off-label use is that it allows
more data to be readily available to prescribers. The main thrust of the
proponents' arguments revolves around the theory that for the benefit of
patients, it is essential to allow drug manufacturers to market the off-label
uses of their products in medical literature and events frequented by
medical practitioners. By doing so, physicians and other medical personnel
are able to make more informed decisions for their patients' treatment.
Leaders of the American Medical Association ("AMA") have commented
that section 401 is a "meticulously crafted, bipartisan provision [that] sets
out both a suitable mechanism and pertinent safeguards that assure that the
information manufacturers disseminate is both appropriate and credible." 5'
Proponents of the free dissemination of information regarding off-label use
believe that because off-label use is so widespread, it is imperative for
medical practitioners to have access to the most up-to-date information in
order to formulate the most informed decision when treating their patients.
Because physicians receive a large amount of information from the
pharmaceutical companies, placing restrictions on the dissemination of such
information can potentially lead to patients receiving sub-optimal
treatments.52
According to proponents, prescribing physicians could benefit from the
additional data about drugs. It is nearly impossible for a physician to read
all of the medical journals and compendia available, especially given the
proliferation of medical reading materials, both hard copy and on the
internet, in the last decade alone. As Senator Bill Frist, one of the authors
of section 401, stated in his congressional testimony, "If a conscientious
doctor were to read two medical articles before retiring every night, he
would have fallen 550 years behind in his reading at the end of the first
year." 53 There is a high potential risk of a physician missing an important
study that may have a significant impact on his or her treatment decisions.
It is therefore asserted that if a drug marketer is given the freedom to
advertise the drug for unapproved uses, then the potential for a physician to
51. Stephanie Stapleton, AMA: Science Must be Key in Off-Label Drug Information
(Aug. 18. 1997), at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick-97/pickO818.htm.
52. Richard C. Ascroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal Foundation Cases on
PharmaceuticalManufacturerPracticesin the United States, 34 IND. L. REv. 95, 99 (2000).
53. Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 13.
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receive incomplete or inaccurate information is significantly decreased.
Another reason in favor of free dissemination of off-label information
was the delay and cost of the FDA's drug approval process. The FDA
approval process is complex and detailed, and its timing cannot keep up
with the fast pace of medical discovery about pharmaceutical benefits. Even
with the advent of the accelerated "fast-track" approval process,54 the
process for drug approval is one that is still lengthy and time-consuming.
In 2000, the process for approval was estimated to take between seven to
ten years.55 The practical effect of the process is that it is hard to for
regulators to keep up with the pace of medical technology and research. 6
Additionally, the FDA drug approval process imposes high costs. The
average cost to get a drug on the market was estimated to be $880 million
per drug over fifteen years.57 Permitting off-label advertising for a drug
allows the drug manufacturer to postpone committing to the approval
process and thus keep research and development costs down, while still
gaining the revenue from off-label sales. The cost benefits to the FDA
from permitting off-label advertisement are also apparent. Former House
Commerce Committee counsel, Alan Slobodin, commented that the FDA
was unnecessarily expending resources monitoring off-label uses.5 9 If the
agency was to permit such off-label uses, resources could be6 used for other
more pressing purposes, such as the evaluation of new drugs. 0
A further advantage of a liberal off-label use policy cited by the
proponents is the benefit such advertisements will have on the twenty
million Americans who are suffering from orphan diseases. 6' Federal law
defines orphan diseases, such as Lou Gehrig's disease and cystic fibrosis, as
those diseases that afflict fewer than 200,000 Americans. 62 Because orphan
diseases affect a small minority of the American public, it is not
economically reasonable for a drug manufacturer to conduct expensive
clinical studies into a new use for a drug that will benefit only a small
number of people. 6 Thus, those who are afflicted with orphan diseases are
typically treated with medications that are used off-label. With the free
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
Drugs:
(1999).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

21 U.S.C. §§ 360(b) (2000), 356 (2000).
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1.
Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 6.
The Race to Computerize Biology, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 17.
Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy,, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181, 194
Id. at 195.
Id.
Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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dissemination of off-label information those medical practitioners who treat
orphan disease will be privy to more information regarding the treatment
options available for their patients afflicted with these rare diseases.' In
some circumstances, the manufacturer may go further and adopt the orphan,
receiving federal research grant funds and obtaining exclusive marketing
rights for the sponsor whose orphan drug is approved for a rare disease. 61
Some commentators assert that off-label announcements will help to
expedite the development and accessibility of new treatments. By reducing
the time and money needed to pass the rigorous FDA approval process prior
to a new claim, it is argued, the manufacturers can redirect these resources
66
towards the development of new uses for their FDA approved products.
Although these benefits all seem persuasive, opponents to the
dissemination of information for unapproved indications also have a
number of valid arguments that have influenced many of the restrictions
found in section 401.
VII. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING EASIER OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
The arguments opposing a liberal off-label policy of promoting
unapproved pharmaceuticals are compelling. Before FDAMA was adopted,
the FDA asserted that permitting drug companies to promote off-label use
would remove incentives to obtain definitive clinical study data, weaken the
goal of evidence-based medicine, erode the drug efficacy requirements, and
harm patients by unstudied uses that "actually lead to bad results, or that
are merely ineffective., 67 After FDAMA section 401 was adopted, the
amendment drew harsh criticism from consumer groups who asserted that
section 401 provides "dangerously inadequate protection for the American
public from the substantial risks of unknowingly being prescribed drugs for
off-label uses., 68 In a congressional submission, Public Citizen, a
"consumer watchdog group," asserted that section 401 did not do enough
to protect consumers. The group asserted that in FDAMA, Congress
"shamelessly" ignored the deaths resulting from the "fen-phen" disaster,
and argued that additional "objective comparative drug information"
should be written specifically to consumers disclosing all the risks and

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Orphan Drugs Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2000).
See Salbu, supra note 58, at 193.
Woodcock, supra note 17.

PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP'S COMMENTS ON: FDA PROPOSED
REGULATION ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON UNAPPROVED/NEW USES FOR
MARKETED DRUGS, BIOLOGICS AND DEVICES (July 1998), at http://www.citizen.org/

publications/release.cfm?ID=6643.
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benefits associated with the prescription drugs and their off-label uses.69
Public Citizen also expressed discontent towards the Congressional
oversight committee for not inviting representatives of consumer and
patient groups, such as Public Citizen, to testify on the impact of FDAMA,
but allowing to representatives of the regulated industries to make
presentations. Public Citizen wrote:
"This special interest law places the economic well-being of
multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers above the health and safety
of the American public and marks a low point in U.S. drug regulatory
history by weakening law meant to protect the public from needless druginduced injury. Congress, by continually adding new responsibilities to
an overburdened FDA, while keeping the Agency's budget constant, in
effect ties the hands of the FDA and 7 0deregulates the pharmaceutical
industry at the expense of public safety.,
The lower proof prerequisites required had the effect of altering the
historical basis for having a proof of drug efficacy in the first place. Forty
years of experience with the effectiveness requirement showed that it made
a difference in the validity of drug product claims. Because a promotional
effort supporting a drug's unapproved use, by encouraging off-label use
among physicians, lacks the public health protection that comes with having
the FDA screen the validity of the claim, opponents argue that using a drug
in an unapproved fashion poses a serious threat to consumer safety. This
argument has history behind it. To pass the agency's rigid drug approval
scrutiny, sponsors have known since the early 1960's that they must
generate strong evidence of the safety and efficacy of the drug. No such
comprehensive showing is required before commencing the promotion of
the drug for an off-label use. 71
The FDA takes a similar position against the promotion of off-label use.
The agency believes permitting off-label promotion undermines its
authority by allowing drug manufacturers to bypass its strict review and
approval process. Additionally, the lack of resources available limits the
agency's ability to effectively regulate such off-label promotion to assure
manufacturers are complying with the statutory requirements. However,
the agency, realizing that off-label use is becoming increasingly popular in
modem medical practice, is constantly looking for ways to increase its

69.
REP.

PUBLIC CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, STATEMENT TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF
COMMERCE COMM. ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FDAMA (Oct. 1998), at

http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6660.
70. See PUBLIC CrnZEN, supra note 68.
71. Salbu, supra note 58, at 202.
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involvement in this area.72
The next issue deals with the disincentives created by a strict off-label
use policy. Opponents claim that relaxing the legal standards for promotion
of an off-label use removes any incentive for drug manufacturers to spend
the time and money needed to perform clinical studies to prove the safety
and efficacy of their product. In fact, if a manufacturer does conduct such
clinical studies he may learn that off-label use is in fact ineffective and/or
harmful, and thus be banned from further sale of the product. 3 Opponents
cite the Fen-Phen debacle as evidence of the consequences that can occur
when drugs are used in an unapproved form for an unapproved purpose
without conducting more research into their safety.74 The incentive that
justified expenditures for testing was the ability to later advertise this drug
for this purpose. The post-FDAMA ability to promote the off-label use of
their product causes drug manufacturers to be unmotivated to conduct
clinical research into the safety and efficacy of their product. Competing
drug manufacturers are also discouraged from conducting such research
studies for comparative and competitive entries into that market, and the
market for drug clinical studies is this reduced. If one manufacturer is able
to advertise their product's off-label use and gain the sales from such
advertisements, competing manufacturers will not spend the time and
money conducting clinical trials to prove the safety of their product for the
same use, particularly when such research will amount to lost sales from
such delay. 5
Perhaps the most telling argument against the free promotion of off-label
use by drug manufacturers is that allowing such promotion will encourage
manufacturers to "game the system," to seek FDA approval only for the
narrowest and easiest to establish uses for their products.
If the
manufacturer knows that it can advertise the product for a variety of uses
once initial approval of a use is granted, the drug firm will be unlikely to
make its initial application to the FDA broader than necessary. Under this
concept, a drug manufacturer will conduct only the minimum required
number of clinical trials needed to gain initial approval for one basic use.
The many other disease indications for which the drug will be actively
marketed will not have been proven safe or effective. 6 Dr. Sidney Wolfe of
Public Citizen commented: "In a sense, huge numbers of people are going
to be made guinea pigs for unapproved uses of drugs."77
72.

Ascroft, supra note 52, at 101.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 18.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.

77.

Schiavone, supra note 24, at i.
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These opponent concerns are directly addressed in FDAMA with the
requirement that the drug manufacturer wishing to make the claim is
required to certify to the FDA that it will file a new drug application
("NDA") for the off-label use, or submit to the FDA a protocol and
schedule for conducting the requisite clinical studies and filing a
supplemental application.78
Another consideration focusing on the patient's interest is the issue of
As recently as ten years ago most insurance
insurance coverage.
companies, HMOs, and governmental plans, including Medicaid, refused to
cover the cost of off-label medications. 9 Insurance companies typically
considered such uses to be experimental and refused to reimburse patients
for the costs of such treatments.8 ° Some insurance companies, including
Kaiser Permanente, have conceded to cover uses listed in major compendia,
but many off-label uses for drugs are still not included in these
compilations. 8' Patients, therefore, are often left to pay out-of-pocket for
such off-label drugs and devices, costs of which are anything but minimal.82
Most states, however, have since passed legislation prohibiting insurance
companies from excluding coverage for the off-label use of a drug in the
treatment of certain ailments.83 States vary on the limitations included in
their individual legislations. Maine, for example, limits coverage to just the
treatment of cancer, HIV, or AIDS, 84 whereas California takes a broader
view covering the use of a drug in the treatment of any "chronic and
'
seriously debilitating condition." 85
Insurance carriers are under pressure to cover all off-label uses. The
AMA's official policy encourages such coverage, stating, "[w]hen the
prescription of a drug or use of a device represents safe and effective
therapy, third party payers should consider the intervention as reasonable
and necessary medical care, irrespective of labeling, and should fulfill their

78. 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2000).
79. This remains an active area of conflict regarding denials of coverage; see, e.g.,
Coram Healthcare Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002 WL 31599577 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding that the FDA does not approve drugs generally, but for use with specific illnesses).
80. Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug
Prescribing, 5 INDEP. REV. 25, 35 (Oct. 2000).
81. Telephone Interview with Patricia Van Patten, Pharmacy Business Support
Specialist, Kaiser Permanente (Nov. 26, 2002).
82. Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 20.
83. Tabarrok, supra note 80, at 35.
84. 24 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2320-G (West 2002).
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.7 (West 2000).
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obligation to their beneficiaries by covering such therapy." 86 With such
strong support, and with the increasing popularity of off-label use, there
may very well be significant changes made in the carriers' policies in the
future.
Opponents argue that physicians both have access to all medical journals
and are able to place special requests with drug manufacturers for any
information that may be unavailable through traditional sources. These
opponents presuppose that the physician is aware of the off-label use and
has the time to make such requests. Typically, a physician has to make
quick treatment decisions for his patient. If he has to wait for a response
from a drug manufacturer, the patient may unnecessarily suffer from such
delay.87
In summary, the opponents' arguments appear to have more validity.
Without a sufficient regulatory control, market forces alone give inadequate
incentives to protect the drug consumer. Some drug manufacturers may
abuse the process by not investing in proof of the safety and efficacy of
their product and by skewing the promotion of their product to their
financial benefit. The safety of the American consumer was the reason why
efficacy proof was required in new drugs after 1962, and it remains a
societal imperative. These concerns have influenced Congress's passage of
FDAMA and its requirements, but the resistance by drug marketers has
called into question the degree to which the FDA could protect consumers
from ineffective drugs.
VIII. IMPACTS OF RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION

The manufacturers of pharmaceuticals have been aided in their
arguments by a Washington-based advocacy organization that supports the
business community's efforts to reduce federal regulatory power. Eight
years of litigation against the FDA by a group advocating for less FDA
regulation resulted in a historic retreat by the FDA from an aggressive view
of its post-FDAMA power to regulate product claims.
In 1993, the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF") filed a citizen's
petition with the FDA claiming that the agency's restrictions on the
distribution of off-label information at continuing medical education
("CME") programs violated drug manufacturers' First Amendment rights.

86. AM. MED. ASS'N, OFFICIAL POLICY, H-120.988 PATIENT ACCESS TO TREATMENTS
PRESCRIBED BY THEIR PHYSICIANS, (1995-1998), http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pLonline/
pfonline?fLn=browse&doc=policyfiles/HOD/H- 120.988.HTM.
87. Bradshaw, supra note 12, at 13.
88. Citizen Petition, at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/Ol/MayO1/053001/
cp0000I 04_tab_c.pdf.
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When the FDA denied the petition, WLF filed a lawsuit in the District
Court for the District of Columbia ("WLF I"), claiming that the FDA's offlabel policies infringed on the First Amendment rights of WLF members.8 9
The FDA responded by attempting to get the case dismissed on various
grounds, 9° including arguing that WLF lacked standing to bring the suit
because statements of policy are not final and should not be subjected to
judicial review. 9' The judge, however, rejected the FDA's arguments and
the case proceeded to the discovery phase.92
In the discovery phase, WLF was allowed the rare freedom to depose
top-ranking FDA officials,93 including the Associate Commissioner for
Policy Coordination, the Director of the Office of Compliance, Center for
Devices and Radiological Health, and even the Commissioner. 9' Following
discovery and other pre-trial preparations, both the FDA and WLF filed
motions for summary judgment with the court.
In 1997, in a historic move by Judge Royce C. Lamberth, the court
denied the FDA's motion and granted WLF's motion for summary
judgment. In his opinion, Judge Lamberth acknowledged off-label use as
an "established aspect of the modem practice of medicine" whereby open
dissemination of scientific information regarding such uses are "of great
import" to the medical community.95 The threshold issue in WLF I was the
determination of whether the FDA's policies were regulating speech or
regulating conduct. Because conduct was afforded less constitutional
protection than speech, this threshold issue was critical to the outcome
reached in the case. The court, rejecting the FDA's argument that the
policies involved conduct, stated that "[tihis court is hard pressed to believe
that the agency is seriously contending that 'promotion' of an activity is
conduct and not speech,96 or that 'promotion' is not entitled to First
Amendment protection. ,
Next, the court addressed how to classify the "speech." Rejecting the
FDA's argument that the "speech" falls outside of First Amendment
protection because of the government's broad powers to regulate industry,
89. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Jeffrey N. Gibbs, First Amendment Limits on Regulating Information: An Initial
Reaction to the Washington Legal Foundation Case, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 597, 597-598
(1998).
93. Such policy oriented questioning of agency managers is typically refused. See U.S.
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
94. Gibbs, supra note 92, at 598 (former FDA Commissioner David Kessler resigned for
other reasons before the date of deposition and was never deposed by WLF).
95. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
96. Id. at 59.
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the court found that the agency did not have an unrestricted power to limit
speech. The court stated that although scientific and academic speech
"reside at the core of the First Amendment" and require the highest degree
of constitutional protection, such information should be classified as
commercial in nature because manufacturers have a direct financial interest
in the promotion of off-label information. 97
Unlike pure speech,
commercial speech is subjected to more relaxed judicial standards.98 Once
the court determined that "speech" was commercial, it then applied the
four-pronged Central Hudson test, which is used to review the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. 9
In applying the Central Hudson test, the court initially found that health
claims made in off-label promotional material were neither unlawful nor
inherently misleading. In his opinion, Judge Lamberth criticized the FDA's
characterization of the off-label "speech" as inherently misleading: "In
asserting that any and all scientific claims about the safety, effectiveness,
contraindication, side effects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are
presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the
opportunity to evaluate them, [the] FDA exaggerates its overall place in the
universe."'°° Judge Lamberth further noted that the FDA has a number of
internal controls in place that assure the off-label "speech" being
disseminated is reliable and truthful. However, Judge Lamberth placed a
caveat on his ruling, stating that his decision in no way hinders the FDA
from restricting claims that are actually false and misleading.' '
Next, the court evaluated the remaining three Central Hudson prongs.
The court found that the government has a substantial governmental interest
in regulating off-label speech in order to protect the health and safety of the
American public.'0 2 Within this general protection of health and safety, the
government stated that curtailing off-label promotion furthers two specific
interests: 1) ensuring that unbiased and accurate information is
disseminated to medical practitioners, and 2) providing manufacturers with
97. Id. at 62-64.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980). In commercial speech cases, a court must first determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. To satisfy the first prong, the expression must concern a
lawful activity and not be misleading. Second, a court must determine whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries are answered in the affirmative, the
court must then determine whether the regulation directly advances the asserted
governmental interest, and finally, whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. Id.
100. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
101. Id. at 68.
102. Id.
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the incentive to receive FDA approval for their product's previously
unapproved uses. Finding only the latter interest legitimate, the court held
that the government could not regulate off-label "speech" out of fear of
misuse by physicians. The court stated, "a physician's livelihood depends
upon the ability to make accurate, life-and-death decisions based upon the
scientific evidence before them,"'' 3 and thus, it can be assumed that a
physician will have the sophistication and knowledge to critically evaluated
any information concerning off-label use that is presented to them.
Additionally, the court found that because the FDA does not pass
judgment on a physician's ability when an off-label use article is presented
in sources or contexts unrelated to drug manufacturers, the agency's
assertion of its power to limit claims for the "good of the recipient" was
"wholly and completely unsupportable." It questioned as unclear "why the
ability of a doctor to critically evaluate scientific findings depends upon
how the article got into the physician's hands, or whether a manufacturer
suggests speakers or content for a CME seminar."'04
Deferring to the judgment of Congress, the court held that the
government does have a substantial public safety interest in compelling
manufacturers to get approval of off-label claims. The third prong of the
Central Hudson test states that a restriction on commercial speech must
advance a governmental interest in a direct and material way. By
proscribing a manufacturer's ability to market their product for an off-label
use, there is a strong financial incentive for the manufacturer to file a
supplemental application for the new use with the FDA. The court found
these restrictions to directly advance the government's substantial
interest. 05
Despite being successful on the first three prongs of the Central Hudson
test, the FDA failed to convince the court on the fourth prong, i.e., that the
restrictions were no more extensive than necessary. The court noted there
were a number of less restrictive alternatives were available to the
government that similarly encourage drug companies to seek FDA approval
for their products' off-label uses. For the court, the most apparent
alternative was full disclosure of the risks and benefits of the product by the
manufacturer.1°6 Although the court believed this alternative to be less
burdensome and still effective in satisfying the needs of the FDA and
Congress, it found that given the nature of drug manufacturers, the ideal of
full disclosure may be too much to expect. Thus, finding the restrictions on

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
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off-label speech overly broad, the court granted WLF's summary judgment
motion, ruling that the FDA could not constitutionally restrict drug
manufacturers from promoting the off-label uses of their products to the
medical profession.07
In the midst of the WLF I case, Congress passed FDAMA. As discussed
previously, FDAMA's section 401 permitted manufacturers to disseminate
off-label information in specific medical literature, provided the
manufacturer complies with a number of onerous statutory conditions.
These conditions conflicted with the WLF I ruling, so WLF sued again
("WLF II"). In 1999, the same district court held that the injunction
imposed in WLF I applied to section 401 of FDAMA. 0 8 The ruling in WLF
1I delivered a major defeat for the FDA -by striking down portions of
FDAMA for violation of the First Amendment. In his ruling, Judge
Lamberth described the governments' arguments supporting FDAMA as
"preposterous."' 9 Affirming its prior decision declaring the speech at issue
commercial, the court applied the Central Hudson test to the restrictions
found in FDAMA. As it did in the WLF I decision, the district court held
that section 401 was overly extensive in scope. The court found that the
requirements, particularly the requirement that drug manufacturers file a
supplemental application for the new use with the FDA, constituted a type
of "constitutional blackmail" on manufacturers to conduct clinical
studies."0 Additionally, the court found that adequate incentives were
already in place to encourage drug manufacturers' to seek additional FDA
approval, such as the ability to market approved products to a wider market,
a greater confidence on the part of doctors to prescribe drugs for such
approved uses, and protection from future tort claims against the
manufacturer."' The court noted that manufacturers are acutely aware that
as the market for prescription drugs becomes more competitive, the
guarantee of safety and reliability that comes with an FDA approval will
become more important as a deciding factor for health care providers. It is
this market pressure that will motivate the manufacturer to seek FDA
approval for their off-label use. Given these pre-existing incentives and the
availability of less-burdensome alternatives, the court held that FDAMA
unduly burdens commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment.
Amending the WLF I order sua sponte, the court declared these conditions
107. Id. at 73-74.
108. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 88 (D.D.C. 1999).
109. Id. at 85.
110. Id. at87.
111. Marc J. Sheineson, Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman Decision on the
Dissemination of Scientific Information on Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drugs, 12
HEALTH LAW. 18, 19 (1999).
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2
of section 401 of FDAMA unenforceable.
Response to the ruling in WLF II was immediate. Shawn Gunnarson of
the WLF described Judge Lamberth's ruling in WLF II as "mak[ing] it very
clear that the First Amendment is alive and well."" 3 WLF's attorneys
called their cases "the pivotal cases influencing the evolution of FDA's
approach to marketing."" 4 The FDA position was recognized by most
experts as having been adversely affected by the WLF II case. "'
The
District of Columbia Circuit issued its opinion in February 2000, dismissing
the appeal and vacating the lower court's injunction." 6 The Court of
Appeals decision was based primarily on the FDA's oral argument at the
hearing, which made the very critical concession that its interpretation of
FDAMA is limited to the establishment of a "safe harbor" under which
manufacturers would be protected from misbranding or "intended use"
7
enforcement actions if they comply with certain statutory requirements. 1

In light of the agency's restated policy position, the WLF dropped its
constitutional objections to FDAMA. Nevertheless, the court issued its
mandate vacating the WLF H district court injunction and stating that "[t]he
government has announced here nothing less than an official interpretation
of the FDAMA which the agency may not change unless it provides a
reasoned explanation for doing so."" 8 The result of the years of litigation
was that the manufacturers prevailed, but the rules for future conduct
remained cloudy.' '9
The outcome of the WLF litigation was worth the drug industry
investment in support of the efforts. 20 FDA is now constrained in its use of
section 401, and drug claims will undergo 401 scrutiny only when the
marketer seeks a safe harbor for those claims. In order to comply with the
First Amendment and the rulings in the WLF cases, the FDA had to accept
a more limited role under FDAMA; section 401 is not the mandatory
screening tool for all claims that had been its 1997 intention. The future
enforcement attitude of the FDA may be more restrained; coincidentally, in

112. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
113. Judge Overturns Law That Limits Release of Drug-Use Info., N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1999, at A18.
114. John Kamp et al., FDA Marketing v. First Amendment: Washington Legal
FoundationLegal Challenges to Off-Label Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at
FDA, 54 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 555 (1999).
115. Cooper, supra note 47.
116. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 335.
118. Id. at 336-337.
119. Cooper, supra note 47.
120. The pharmaceutical industry's amicus brief supported WLF. Henney, 202 F.3d at
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2001, Daniel Troy, the successful litigation advocate for WLF, became
Chief Counsel of the FDA.2
IX. LIABILITY RESULTING FROM OFF-LABEL USES
When a patient is injured by the off-label use of a product, he or she will
typically file a products liability claim against the manufacturer and a
malpractice claim against the doctor. These dual claims often lead to the
battle of the defendants at trial, where each side blames the other for the
resulting injury.
The manufacturer claims the doctor's use was
unforeseeable, while the doctor claims that such use was one commonly
engaged in by the profession and sanctioned by the manufacturer.'22 The
informational material, or lack thereof, circulated to medical community
concerning such off-label use, is strong evidence either for or against the
manufacturer's knowledge about the foreseeability of such off-label usage.
The jury will ultimately determine who should be held liable to the patient
for the failure to warn, if such a failure is a remedy in tort.
A. ManufacturerLiability
Regulatory inaction against a drug marketer's off-label promotion does
not mean the drug marketer is free of adverse consequences. If drug
manufacturers promote their products for off-label uses, potential tort
liability may increase. The manufacturer has a duty to warn about the risks
involved with its product. Most pharmaceutical product liability cases arise
under a claim of failure to warn.' 23 Plaintiffs assert the off-label use of the
drug that caused the harm should have been the subject of a warning; in
their defense, manufacturers argue that there was no way that they could
have foreseen their products being used in such an unapproved manner, and
therefore the drug marketer should not be held liable for the injury resulting
from such unapproved use. The defendant marketer
is considered an expert
24
defense.
a
such
with
successful
and is rarely
Since the passage of FDAMA, it will be even harder for a manufacturer
to prove that it was unaware that its product was being used for such
unapproved purposes. The manufacturer is obligated to include certain
disclosures (e.g. that the drug has not been approved by the FDA) in its
labeling and other marketing materials for the product's off-label uses. A
plaintiff's search of the electronic databases retained by the manufacturer
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See www.fda.gov for a listing of the FDA board members.
Rheingold, supra note 32, at 55.
Ascroft, supra note 52, at 108.
Rheingold, supra note 32, at 55.
21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2000).
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will show that others asked about the same type of use for this drug.
Tort liability for the drug manufacturer can also stem from incomplete
product testing, 2 6 or the negligent transmission to the FDA of incomplete or
inaccurate clinical data to support such use.127 But failure to warn litigation
is the most likely liability risk for manufacturers. Both litigation expenses
and damage awards can cause a significant cost
burden to the manufacturer,
12
which will be passed along to drug purchasers. 1
Pharmaceutical marketers asserted that Congress should pass preemptive
legislation that exonerates drug companies from liability for any label
statement that had received FDA approval. 129 They claim that through the
approval process, the FDA is asked to make significant judgments on the
risk, safety, and reliability of new drugs and new indications, and these
judgments should receive deference in the form of preclusion of jury
verdicts about unreasonable risks from an FDA-reviewed product.3 ° The
drug industry asserts that federal preemption of state law would lead to a
greater number of tort outcomes consistent with the regulatory reviews of
those products. The present lack of consistency in state jury outcomes has
proven very challenging for pharmaceutical manufacturers, who market and
sell their products across many jurisdictions with a single U.S. label.'
B. Physician Liability
Drug marketers have no common law or statutory duty to directly warn
patients of the risks involved with prescription drugs. Manufacturers,
however, fulfill their legal duty by providing adequate warnings to
physicians, under the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 2 by which
manufacturers are obligated to adequately disclose to physicians all known
risks and contraindications for their products. 133
Additionally,
manufacturers must continually monitor the product's use and is held
accountable to respond to any new risks that may occur. Once a
126. Strict liability for inadequate warning arises when an adverse effect of a drug is
"known or reasonably scientifically knowable", under some states' jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Cal. 1996).
127. Negligence claims may survive but a direct claim of fraud upon the FDA would
probably be rejected under the Supreme Court's approach in the comparable claim of
medical device fraud, Buckman v. Plaintiff's Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
128. Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Products Liability and "Off-Label" Uses of Prescription
Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 275, 301 (1996).
129. Ascroft, supra note 52, at 109.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 109-10.
132. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6, cmt. e (1998).
133. Miller v. Pfizer, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1121 (D. Kan. 2002); Martin v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 353 (I11.
1996).
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manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn the learned intermediary, it generally
wins tort cases alleging a failure to warn.134
Placing the ultimate duty to warn patients in the hands of the physician is
essential to preserving the doctor-patient relationship. Because physicians
make the individualized decisions on the treatment of their patients, they
are in the best position to convey the risks and benefits of such treatment to
their patients.
Treatment decisions are based on the circumstances
surrounding the individual's ailment, and the treating physician should be
the most familiar with these circumstances. Assuming that the physician is
fully informed by the manufacturer of the drug's risks and benefits,'35 the
physician is then under a duty to disclose these risks and to gain the
patient's informed consent to treatment. Physicians do not routinely obtain
the signed informed consent of patients when prescribing a particular
drug,
36
and such a requirement would probably be awkward if it existed.
If the patient claims malpractice from the prescription of inappropriate
medications, commentators have suggested that the causes of action could
include failure to obtain informed consent, ordinary negligence, or strict
liability arising out of failure to adhere to the statements about the drug in
the Physician Desk Reference ("PDR") or package insert. 37 The exposure
to potential liability increases as the doctor diverges from customary
medical standards of care. In the fen-phen litigation, doctors prescribed
diet drugs for periods of time longer than the brief use approved by the
FDA on the drug's labeling, and prescribed it for some patients who should
not have qualified for its use. '
In the bone (pedicle) screw cases,
orthopedists used screws designed for long bones, like the femur, during
more delicate back surgery. 3 9 As one court held, "[p]hysicians may be
found negligent if their decision to use a drug off-label is sufficiently
careless, imprudent or unprofessional. "'40
In Richardson v. Miller, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice and
products liability action against her attending physician claiming negligence
and violation of the standard of due care for the use of terbutaline during
her labor. Although terbutaline was approved by the FDA only for the
treatment of bronchial asthma, it was commonly used by physicians to help

134. Nicole Endejann, Is the FDA's Nose Growing?: The FDA Does Not "Exaggerate"
its Overall Place in the Universe When Regulating Speech Incidental to "Off-Label"
PrescriptionDrug Labeling and Advertising, 35 AKRON L. REv. 491, 524-26 (2002).

135.
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137.
138.
139.
140.

§ 6 (d)(1) (1998).
Endejann, supra note 134, at 526.
Rheingold, supra note 32, at 54-55.
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002).
Rheingold, supra note 32, at 52.
Richardson v. Miller, 44 S. W. 3d 1, 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
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4
retard the progression of labor in mothers by relaxing the uterine muscles.' '
Terbutaline may be taken orally or in a pump designed to subcutaneously42
intervals.
inject small amounts of the drug into the patient's body in timed
Despite having little experience with the terbutaline pump, the defendant
physician arranged for an infusion pump to be attached to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the administration of terbutaline during
her labor, she suffered a major heart attack resulting in permanent heart
damage. ' 4 At trial, the court granted defendant's motion to exclude all
references made to the off-label use of terbutaline, including the drug's
listing in the PDR and its package insert.' 44 On appeal, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals found that the trial court had committed reversible error by
excluding this evidence. 45 The court found that information regarding the
off-label nature of a drug is essential in helping to establish the standard of
care against which the defendant should be judged.' 46 The defendant failed
to abide by the warnings issued by the FDA which cautioned against the use
of a terbutaline infusion pump in the treatment of pre-term labor. Thus, the
appeals court found that the lower court's decision to exclude such evidence
on the dangers of off-label use of terbutaline "materially hampered" the
plaintiff's ability to prove her medical malpractice claims against the
defendant. The47court vacated the lower court verdict and remanded the case

for a new trial.

Under a claim of pure negligence, a plaintiff must prove the physician's
conduct was a significant departure from the standard of care of a
Typically, a
reasonable physician under similar circumstances.' 48
physician's standard of care is established by evaluating how physicians in
similar situations acted on prior occasions in treating their respective
patients. 9
Standards of care for medical practitioners vary among different
communities and expert witnesses are required to know the community
standards of the place where the injury occurred9 At trial, the burden of
proof rests with the prescribing physician to justify a deviation from the
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.

144. Id. at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 15.
147. Id. at 23.
148. See, e.g., Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976); McMullen v. Ohio State
Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ohio 2000).
149. Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ohio 1993).
150. Proctor v. Patel, 2002 WL 462941, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), citing Bruni v.
Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673.
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standard of care.' 5' Negligence claims often result in a battle of experts- the
plaintiff's experts try to characterize the physician's conduct as a gross
departure from the standard of care while the defendant's experts try to
establish that the5 2physician's conduct was in fact in accordance with
ordinary protocol.
Another cause of action against a physician is a claim of strict liability.
A plaintiff may use FDA-approved labeling, the Physician's Desk
Reference listing, and the package insert, to establish a prima facie standard
of care in the use of a particular medication. The burden of proof then lies
with the defendant physician to explain the off-label use of the product in
accordance with the standard. The vast majority of cases, including the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Richardson, have held that the PDR listing
is admissible at trial in establishing a standard of care, but only if expert
testimony regarding standard of care is introduced during trial."'
Besides tort claims, an injured patient may bring a malpractice cause of
action against his or her physician for the off-label use or, even, for failure
to use the drug in an off-label way if it would have been the best treatment
option for the patient.' 4 Medical malpractice claims regarding prescribing
practices have increased in recent years. As Dr. Michael Fetters, assistant
professor of family medicine at the University of Michigan stated, "I think
physicians are always practicing with some unconscious fear of being sued
because it is very prevalent.""' Medical malpractice laws vary from state
to state.
Medical malpractice insurance and defense is a significant cost for
physicians, and medical literature cautions that physicians who prescribe
medications for off-label use has resulted in potentially greater malpractice
risk. To reduce risk, physicians are urged to remain informed on the latest
news for the medication and its uses, maintain a file separate from the
patients' files on the literature dealing with the off-label use of the
medication, emphasize to the patient that the proposed treatment involves
the off-label use of the medication, and document the continuous informed
consent by the patient to such treatment.' 56 The commentators' emphasis is
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placed on continuous communication between the manufacturer and the
physician, the physician and the patients, and the physician and the medical
community. Ultimately, it will be the physicians, keeping in mind the
potential liability, who will decide the best treatment options for their
patients.
X. POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE CHANGES IMPACTING LIABILITY

FOR OFF-LABEL USES
Product liability law is a branch of common law torts that has
traditionally varied among the states. For example, no national products
liability law covers all pharmaceutical "failure to warn" claims. The
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability was recommended to the states
by the American Law Institute in 1997. However, its provisions show a
heavy influence by the drug industry and the defense bar, so it remains
controversial when considered by state courts. This inconsistency poses a
number of difficulties for both the pharmaceutical marketer, whose
promotional activities span many jurisdictions, and the physician, who must
weigh the potential malpractice liability risks against the benefits of the
treatment options for his or her patient.
The drug industry has sought to preempt state tort law governing offlabel use of prescription drugs, by proposals for a federal statute that
includes a defense that FDA approval of a drug would bar any products
In 1995, the House of
liability claims against the manufacturer.
Representatives passed a products liability bill that would preclude the
award of punitive damages if the marketer satisfies the FDA's requirements
for safety and efficacy for their product and its use. 1 7 This would serve as a
strong economic incentive for pharmaceutical companies to seek FDA
approval for all uses. Additionally, the rejection of punitive damages would
create more certainty for manufacturers because it would negate the current
confusing distinctions across jurisdictions. 58 Although this bill served as an
indication of potential reforms, the industry failure to persuade Congress to
adopt the change will be revisited in the 108th Congress.
The changing environment of the pharmaceutical marketplace is
affecting the actions of manufacturers. As the risk of malpractice liability
increases, physicians may be more cautious about prescribing a medication
to their patient for an off-label use. Thus, as the availability of competing
drugs increases, physicians may prefer treatment options that are approved
by the FDA for that particular use. Specific FDA approval is a signal to the
physician that the product has met safety and efficacy standards. There will
157.
158.

Ascroft, supra note 52, at 116.
Id.
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be a competitive advantage to having the ability to broadly publicize a
drug's approval for this use, including the consumer television advertising
claims that a drug is "now the first drug approved for use against X." With
this increased competition among drug therapies comes an increased
number of sales messages; the sales representative and the advertisements
seek to convince physicians to prescribe the product, and "now FDA
approved for X use" aids in the promotion.
The outcome of the WLF litigation fits into the puzzle here: a "safe
harbor" is quite useful if the FDA does, in fact, take enforcement cases
against drug marketers who make excessive or false claims, and the FDA
enforcement cases inevitably result in negative publicity for the
manufacturer.'5 9 Therefore, it is in the best interest for the manufacturer to
be cautious in following the 401-submission requirement, before making
claims about the off-label use of its product. This caution should induce
manufacturers to use the FDA's section 401 procedures, and at best, should
convince them to seek FDA new drug approval in order to support the
claims made about the product and its particular use.
XI. INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS CHANGE PARADIGMS

Not only is the pharmaceutical marketplace becoming more competitive,
but with the advent of the Internet, manufacturers are also finding new
methods for the dissemination of information regarding the off-label use of
6
their product.' 6° This poses significant policy problems for the FDA. '
Most manufacturers operate websites offering information about their
products and their uses, information that may be accessed by both
consumers and medical professionals. The quality of medical information62
on the Internet varies widely, as medical experts have warned physicians.
The Internet and its implications for off-label use were not debated when
FDAMA was adopted. But the FDA63 has long treated all forms of
promotional media under the same rules.
A commentator observed that because the terms of section 401 do not
mesh well with internet delivery of information, the website dissemination
of data on a drug's off-label use cannot qualify for the "safe harbor"
159. Id. at 115.
160. Leah Brannon, Regulating Drug Promotion on the Internet, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
599, 599 (1999).
161. Id. at 600; for an excellent review of these issues see Nancy K. Plant, Prescription
Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or Trap for the Unwary?, 42 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 89 (1998).
162. William M. Silberg et al., Assessing, Controlling and Assuring the Quality of
Medical Information on the Internet, 277 JAMA 1244 (Apr. 16, 1997).
163. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2000); 60 Fed. Reg. 42581, 42583 (1995).
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protection under section 401. As a result, it is actually subjected to a
greater degree of regulation as a result.' 64 The reader will note with interest
how FDA deals with the enforcement of 401 in the coming years; the
commentator may be correct in anticipating that FDA will challenge
Internet abuses.
The Internet offers many advantages, including ease of access and
variety of forms of data delivery, for both the drug manufacturer and the
prescribing physicians. Its use as a website dissemination medium would
also allow patients to have greater access to information regarding their
treatment options. The website operated by the manufacturer might limit
what it reveals, to avoid regulatory problems; but the off-label use data
might be prominently circulated by private websites which are free to offer
advice and information so long as they do not act as agents of the drug
maker. Further, Internet vendors of drugs are so heedless of regulatory
controls that FDA Commissioner Jane Henney warned in a 2000 speech:
"Unfortunately, the Internet purchase can bypass all of the public health
safeguards."' 65
The Internet's ease of access to information regarding the off-label use
increases the potential liability of manufacturers and physicians.' 66 If there
is a negative consequence from the use of such treatment, it will be harder
to prove that such a consequence was unforeseeable, especially given the
accessibility of the risk information from Internet websites easily located
via search engines. Some commentators argue that the information
disseminated over the Internet should be accorded the same First
Amendment protection as information disseminated via other media. The
many capabilities of the Internet, proponents argue, would allow
manufacturers to tailor their "speech" to comply with the statutory
requirements of FDAMA. 67 Since FDAMA, this issue has been debated
but not resolved, and some form of statutory resolution of the conflict is
inevitable in the future.
XII. OTHER PRESSURES IMPACTING PROMOTIONAL CONTROLS
Harmonization of drug approval across national boundaries 1 68 is an active
164. Shane M. Ward, WLF and the Two-Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity of
the FDA's Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use Information on the Internet, 56 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 41, 54-55 (2001).
165. Dr. Jane Henney, Address to Mid-America Coalition on Health Care (March 27,

2000).
166. Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing the Net in Shallow Waters: Product Liability
Concerns and Advertising on the Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 213 (1998).
167. Id. at 218-19.
168. See http://www.fda.gov/cder/m2/default.htm.
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and growing field, 6 9 and the approval of drug effectiveness claims prior to
marketing is likely to be a tenet of global drug authorities. The bargain that
industry achieved with the U.S. Congress in 1997 to loosen controls on
claims under section 401 may not hold up when other nations ask why
unapproved uses can be widely promoted here. This may be a pressure to
change back toward the 1962 policy of pre-marketing efficacy proofs.
Expanded patient information access may doom the paternalistic
approach to pre-market approval of new uses. A regulatory system that
builds a delay into the passage of data, awaiting scientific verification and
regulatory approval, will inevitably lag behind the speed of electronic
transmission in today's Internet environment. Science is not static and
human clinical research studies are evolving along with pharmaceutical
chemistry. The sick or dying patient is likely to welcome most off-label
use, since the patient can have today's latest therapies based on information
with disclaimers or 1998's therapies based on information with the stamp of
federal approval. Consumers seem to be urging physicians to offer more
choices based upon data that has not awaited federal blessings, and that is a
major paradigm shift from the assumptions that underlie the drug efficacy
statutes of the 1960's.
Additionally, the volume of the activity may make it impossible to police
with the FDA's inadequate enforcement budget. Off-label use is now so
widespread that it is virtually impossible for the regulatory process to keep
up with the pace of innovation. In fact, in some cases the off-label use has
become considered the standard of care, and failure to follow this standard
may be grounds for malpractice claims.170 Drugs used in unapproved
indications are commonplace in the treatment of cancer, AIDS, pediatric
diseases, and rare diseases. Those suffering from these ailments have come
to depend on off-label use in their treatment. However, opponents of the
off-label use believe that expansion of such uses without FDA scrutiny
poses a significant threat to the health and well being of the American
public. Strong voices in the debate surrounding off-label use will advocate
for the two mutually exclusive policy positions.
XIII. CONCLUSION

Off-label use of drugs as a physician choice is a necessary and positive
aspect of flexible treatment for patients. The risks that it carries should be
borne by the physician. If the marketer of a drug wishes to profit from a
drug's sale based on claims of beneficial effects, without first obtaining
169.
(1998).
170.

21 U.S.C. §§ 383, 393(b)(3) (2000); see, e.g., FDA Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 49583
Stoffelmayr, supra note 128, at 278.
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FDA approval of the claims, the drug marketer now can use the FDAMA
section 401 vehicle to begin promoting the off-label use, with some
assurance that its claims are shielded by a "safe harbor."
There are societal costs to giving manufacturers this profitable option.
With the passage of FDAMA section 401 and the government's litigation
concession in the WLF case that limits its coverage to a passive "safe
harbor" role, the promotion of off-label use is institutionally controlled
rather than banned outright. The FDA could act against a drug marketer's
website or oral or written claim, or the marketer can claim a "safe harbor"
under section 401, provided that the manufacturer satisfies certain statutory
requirements. The drug marketer chooses either to be safe or to risk an
of a ban on off-label
FDA challenge.17 ' Either way, the 1962-1997 regime
72
whimper."
a
"with
end
an
to
come
promotion has
However, the 1997 law required a study of the effects of section 401,173
and as the National Academy of Sciences examines the potential abuses that
may arise in future off-label disseminations of claims, it is likely that
Congress will revisit the FDAMA's provisions. When it does, changes in
the pharmaceutical marketplace are likely to affect future legislation. As
this article went to publication, the sponsor of section 401 was elected
Senate Majority Leader,17 4 so his personal stake in preserving the
compromise language of 401 will probably prevent substantial changes for
the near future at least.
As potential liability increases, and global standards for drug claim
support evolve, drug manufacturers may be significantly more motivated to
seek FDA approval for the additional uses of their products. The off-label
use of drugs and devices will remain part of the practice of medicine in the
future. Our society's assignment to the FDA of the role of medication
"gatekeeper" needs to be enhanced, not diminished, in future legislative
negotiations.
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